A new charity?

When I started this blog last August, one of the options that I'd laid out for "becoming directly and personally involved with people who are struggling for their rights" was to establish a charitable organisation. Several factors now seem to prod me in this direction - a somewhat idiosyncratic profile, a need to maintain the status quo, and some very specific ideas about how best to help and work with people.

So what follows is a draft of what I believe the guiding principles of this charitable organisation, which I propose to call the Conversare Foundation, should be. The idea being that we - by which I mean us in the West - work with marginalised people from emerging world countries and support them in realizing their own goals. By acting as advisers, friends and partners, what we can do is facilitate the interaction with Western institutions - work that may range from engaging on their behalf within the organisations with which we are familiar and so act as advocates, to, say, supporting their applications for funding (which is often way beyond the technical or linguistic capacity of any small emerging country organisation). My experience suggests that this type work can be achieved inexpensively, but can greatly facilitate the ability of people to exercise agency. Furthermore - and perhaps most significantly -  the key to this venture is the idea that we learn by doing, and we learn by conversing with one another. This means that the additional aim of the Conversare Foundation is to stimulate the process of information sharing as to how the institutional mechanisms that keep people poor and vulnerable can be overcome.

Thoughts and feedback would be greatly welcomed - as would be volunteers who might like to be either Trustees of the new charity, or activists who might like to participate in our work.

Guiding Principles of the Conversare Foundation

Using the social capital with which it has been endowed, the Conversare Foundation hopes to build authentic and dynamic conversation with disadvantaged, marginalised and vulnerable people in the hope of 'turning together', from the Latin com versare, meaning to turn together[1]. 

For the purpose of this Constitution of the Conversare Foundation, the term ‘capital’ refers to an attribute of individuals and organisations. Capital, in any of its interdependent economic, political or social forms, drives positive feedback loops, changes social relations, and accumulates power for the individual or the organisation. This, and the ability to exchange capital for other forms of capital in proportion to an individual’s or an organisation’s collective endowments, makes capital both desirable and fungible[2].  

An attribute of inadequate capital is marginalisation, resulting in people becoming disadvantaged or vulnerable. Inadequate capital is not merely the lack of financial resources, it is also the inability to exchange individual or collective endowments on favourable terms, so feedback loops remain negative, social relations remain unchanged, and power is not accumulated. Poverty cannot be overcome by merely addressing the symptoms of disadvantage or vulnerability – the deeper systematic problem of marginalisation must also be resolved.

At the Conversare Foundation, we aim to build the capital of disadvantaged, marginalised and vulnerable people by investing in relationships that bridge diametric disparities through friendship and respect; whereby growing awareness and mutual trust then builds the foundation for further development. We believe that disadvantaged, marginalised, and vulnerable people can realise the outcomes they envision for themselves by organising, through engagement with the establishment, and by participating as equals in decision-making processes.

On this basis, the Conversare Foundation has the specific goal of facilitating access to the tools of meaningful engagement with the full range of institutions of the development establishment, be they government, non-government, or international, public, private or other forms of collective organisation, so that the appeals of the disadvantaged, marginalised and vulnerable cannot simply be excluded or ignored through lack of technical capacity or knowledge.

A further aim of the Conversare Foundation is the establishment of a Community of Practice to help shift attitudes as to how the systemic problems of disadvantage, marginalisation and vulnerability are collectively understood and can be strategically overcome.

In order to achieve these goals, the specific objects of the Conversare Foundation are:

1. To encourage, facilitate and support the growth and development of diverse forms of civil society organisations (“CSO”) that are organised and run by disadvantaged, marginalised, or vulnerable people of the emerging world whose principal object is the alleviation of the economic, political, and social poverty affecting them; 
2. To endow those CSOs with the technical expertise, support and training they may need in order to engage effectively with the government, non-government, or international, public, private or other forms of collective institutions of the development establishment; 
3. Where relevant to the achievement of mutual aims, to partner with individual CSOs in order to provide them with the administrative or professional capacity necessary for the effective and responsible management of funding awards or grants until such time as the CSO can effectively manage awards or grants independently of external support;

For the avoidance of doubt:

• All expertise, partnership arrangements, or services provided by the Conversare Foundation to participating CSOs shall be done at no cost to the latter;
• With the exception of staff time and communication expenses, any costs borne by participating CSOs associated with their interaction with the Conversare Foundation shall be reimbursed by the latter upon presentation of suitable receipts.

And...

1. To support collective learning about the systemic problems of disadvantage, marginalisation and vulnerability and how these may be strategically overcome through the establishment of a Community of Practice that documents and disseminates mutual learning as this is generated;
2. To seek funding in support of realising the aims of the Conversare Foundation.

[1] We acknowledge our debt to Ison, R. (2010) ‘Systems Practice: How to Act in a Climate-Change World’ [Ed], Springer, London, The Open University, Milton Keynes

[2] We acknowledge Freinacht, H. (2017) ‘How to Outcompete Capitalism?’ Metamoderna Blogpost [online], available at: http://metamoderna.org/how-to-outcompete-capitalism?lang=en for key elements of this definition.

The impossibility of saying anything even remotely comprehensible...

This blog was written as a result of a request by my friend and brilliant writer Poornima Manco and first appeared on her blog at: poornimamanco.wordpress.com. I really enjoy Poornima's stories - she has a great range, including one of my favourite genres which is Science Fiction. So thank you Poornima for inspiring and encouraging me to write this short piece!

One of my favourite pastimes and one that I had significant opportunities for indulging in as a younger man, was sitting round a table nursing a pint of beer (real ale please) and solving all the world’s problems in conversation with one or two good friends. We usually had everything solved by the third pint, which in turn, opened the way for a celebratory fourth thus reaching my upper limit, especially if I wanted to function well enough to navigate back home. Which describes a particular conceit of mine; in that the world’s problems are solvable. This was an odd thing to be doing and perhaps a greater reflection of the cultural privilege that a white Western man enjoys – although I could not have framed it in quite that way at the time. The conversations were usually between men and, since they only rarely extended to include women, they beg the question (which I could blissfully disregard at the time, although the alcohol-based mental lubrication may have helped somewhat): how are you going to solve anything if fifty per cent of humanity isn’t even represented? Or even, as was definitely the case for this young man in his twenties, I really didn’t control very much at all and actually still don’t. It’s not like I could set global transport policies, or make State planning decisions, or initiate a comprehensive waste recycling scheme – to mention just a few.

That’s not to say that nothing good has come of this particular pastime – on the contrary, some problems did get solved as a direct result. But many fewer than the number and grandeur of those mental palaces I constructed. Worse still, my ability to effectively capture the problem in words seems to be failing. Every time I try to nail something down the issue either slips through my metaphors or my preamble becomes so overly top-heavy that I’ve lost my audience before we can really get started. As there’s less beer involved too, this may underlie part of the difficulty. These days it’s usually my wife who will cut me off leaving just my progeny who occasionally has the patience to put up with her father when he goes off on one of his overbearing rants. But the problem remains – defining issues has become considerably more difficult for me. The thought builds, I try to speak, and in that precise moment a multitude of other issues occur to me demanding my urgent attention, all of which have a direct bearing on the relevance of the issue, and I then feel the need to systematically explore each one. Little wonder perhaps that my family’s switch from good natured tolerance to extreme exasperation sits on a hairpin trigger. Worse still is when I try to write, because most of the time, the effort involved in setting thoughts on paper (computer screen nowadays), it’s like swimming uphill through a sea of mental treacle.

Why are words so damn difficult? Each word is a box inside of which sits the idea of what it is you want to say. Except it’s not really your idea. A “cup of tea” clearly means a mug-shaped vessel made of some kind of porcelain containing about 250ml of recently poured boiling water over brown tea leaves, usually held in a porous paper sachet or bag, with about 30ml of added cold milk. Except it doesn’t, to people who don’t like milk in their tea, or who prefer green tea, or insist on a cup and saucer, or it might even mean a cup filled with tea leaves. Ultimately, you won’t know what the other person understands unless you ask, and if you have to ask about every little thing then life can become quite exhausting. So most people prefer to rely on a form of shorthand and assume that their “cup of tea” is exactly what they imagine it to be. How easy it is to be fooled into a false sense of security, as anybody who has ever had the experience of being asked for “hot tea” by an American. Of course it’s hot, dammit, otherwise it wouldn’t be tea! All this confusion arises from three little words. What these words, these boxes surrounding ideas, these forms of mental shorthand really represent is a social construct – a “cup of tea” is like this because, well because everybody else around me who is like me thinks that this, and only this, is a cup of tea.

This social construct is my identity, and the brilliant thing is that I have many which express themselves in all the different roles I assume every day, as a parent, a husband, a friend, at work or while playing around. Here’s the rub – certain identities carry consequences, whether I like them or not, and I may not even be consciously aware of them. Things such as national origin, religious affiliation, as well as gender, ethnicity, degree of privilege, all define the boundaries – that is – the outer limits of what I’m prepared to accept that each word box will surround. And this has a real bearing on solving all the world’s problems, even when lubricated by my favourite beer. For example, I tend to assume that governments are benign structures mandated to help improve their citizens’ lives. Clearly, most governments are neither benign, nor do their officers feel in any way compelled to act in accordance with enacting or enforcing fundamental human rights principles. So, sitting in the pub, enjoyable though that may be and the odd exception aside, is not the most direct route to solving the world’s problems.

So this is my understanding: fixing anything requires us to understand that everything is a social construct that has been collectively invented by people who share the same identity. So if something is broken, or a problem, a big part of understanding the issue is understanding where the boundaries of our word boxes have been set. Commonly referred to as the paradigm, but that is only a particular word box which contains the idea of a commonly understood idea (I hope you begin to understand why I often feel like I’m swimming uphill through a sea of treacle).

When you are in the forest you can’t see the wood for the trees – what is required is a different perspective. And that means seeking out those who have a different identity, persuading them to share their understanding and taking the time to learn.

Anybody fancy a beer?

Michael in his own words:

For several years, my day job was largely (though not entirely) based on my skills in both the English and French languages – which I found highly amusing as these were, PE aside, the things I was worst in at school. The skills of caring, attention to detail, and customer focus I need for my current day job were essentially acquired through the example given to me by my parents, and most significantly my mother. Married with one lovely child, I live in London. I used to ride motorcycles, but development work and a Masters got in the way, leading to the occasional blog at: http://www.conversareblog.net/.

I aspire to do so again.

Who gets custody of the kids? Why Brexit resembles nothing so much as a divorce.

[I felt the need to write about something else...]

Britain. Europe. Two people who eventually managed to get married back in 1973, once the objecting parent in the shape of France’s Charles de Gaulle had passed away, thus opening the door to their union. As in any marriage, some effort at compromise and adjustment to each other’s behaviours and idiosyncrasies was required, yet the whole was greater than the sum of the parts. With Europe’s support, Britain finally achieved settlement to a hitherto intractable and long-running dispute with Northern Ireland on its side of the family, whereas Europe, with Britain’s support, welcomed family members back into the fold who had been frozen out behind the Iron Curtain for decades. And yet, a problem common among many married couples, was money management, which became a significant source of friction within the couple.

From the get-go, Britain wasn’t too keen on Europe’s CAP outgoings. The issue remained intractable until a marriage guidance counsellor called Thatcher persuaded Europe that compromise could be achieved by contributing slightly less to the household budget in the shape of the 1984 “opt-out”. And then there were things that one partner did that, try as they might, the other partner simply couldn’t get to grips with. Such as the Euro, for example. Or deciding to let certain family members play with the Euro (I mention no names). Or then beating up on that family member (whose name remains un-mentioned) when they got all the rules of the game wrong… But, hey – unlike your friends, you don’t get to choose family. But it’s not a healthy sign when the partners in a marriage decide on having separate bank accounts.

 So at this point I think we’ll skip forward past the acrimonious accusations of whose fault it really is – in a divorcing marriage both sides are invariably at fault even if you really, really don’t think you’ve done anything wrong (if you think that, then the communication broke down years ago, so it’s your fault). One partner went to see their lawyer and, because lawyers don’t get paid for being marriage counsellors, divorce papers got served on the other. And as with all consummated and fruitful marriages (I mean divorces), the most contentious issues revolve around who gets the house, who gets custody of the kids, and how do we split up the pets that we both had while we were still together? Meaning, respectively: the EU divorce bill; the EU nationals living in Britain and vice versa; and Northern Ireland and Gibraltar.

The house: think of it as the common home established by Britain and Europe, but which Britain has decided to leave. You can ‘not pay’, but ‘not pay’ is rather like saying “I’m leaving, you move out!” Far safer – as far as divorce proceedings go – is to ‘pay’, that is to say “I’m leaving, and I’ll help you keep the house”. The kids: “…well, I’d love to continue caring for our children, but now that I’m on my own again – you see – I need to be free…” Most divorce lawyers would probably take a dim view of this sentiment and advise against expressing it during the proceedings. The kids were born to both parents, and duties and obligations that arise as a result need to continue. Treating one child as less deserving than another wouldn’t cut it in a divorce court and it certainly shouldn’t with EU or British nationals’ post-Brexit. The pets: and the divorcing couple are particularly attached to them. We can’t split up the pets without causing them serious emotional harm, and neither side wants to ‘give’ the pet to the other in perpetuity, so the best the couple can do now that they are separating is to find some way of sharing. Which means that they need to work out how.

It’s not too late to go back to marriage guidance counselling…

Migrant workers’ rights in Morocco: developing a proposal

This next story, represent my attempt to resolve a personal dilemma by tying together some the different elements explored in earlier blogs. I have been asked to help a small migrant association in Morocco respond to a grant application issued by the EU with the specific aim of helping migrants integrate into Morocco. The grant is politically motivated, since it supports EU policy of externalising its borders (in this case by getting Morocco to police the land and sea borders with Spain in order to reduce clandestine migration) and because it supports the Moroccan Monarch’s vision of welcoming and integrating migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into the country (and for which the government of Morocco has conducted two exceptional amnesties in 2014 and 2017 that allowed undocumented migrants to become registered). Morocco was recently readmitted into the African Union, and I suspect that the improved treatment of their fellow African’s may have played an important role. The migrant association played an important role throughout all this through its advocacy for improved migrant rights; by educating and raising awareness amongst migrants about the exceptional amnesties; and has gained real hands-on experience of the difficulties involved in achieving migrant integration.

Research I conducted earlier this year suggests that migrants and Moroccans share an important characteristic – neither have conceptualised Morocco as a migrant destination country. Certainly many sub-Saharan migrants with whom I spoke explained that they often felt harassed or threatened in Morocco and which contradicts the “terre d’acceuil” image the country likes to project. Furthermore, this association has effectively run out of money, which means that it is at a critical point since my research also indicates that leadership amongst sub-Saharan African migrants depends almost exclusively on the leader’s ability to provide resources and support to their community. Thirdly, I am conscious of significant difficulties in communication, and this creates a pervading sense of distrust – between migrants and Moroccans, between migrants and Westerners, and even amongst migrants themselves. There are deeper issues at work here, which can probably only be explored at the level of the underlying institutional systems.

This migrant association is extremely well-networked both within Morocco and internationally and consequently discovers opportunities for grant funding. However, the nature of multi-dimensional poverty seems, much like the mythological figure of Tantalus whose reach for grapes that are just out of reach, to condemn both to an eternity of suffering. Grants are not neutral devices for combatting poverty since they require the acquisition and mastery of social technologies that this association does not currently possess. And the development processes that I am familiar with using and which are integral to any grant proposal do not appear to elicit the kinds of critical responses from my interlocutors at the migrants association that would allow me to help them further. We are not, in other words, “turning together” by engaging in a conversation. The Cynefin framework described in an earlier blog helps me here: if all concerned understood the social technology of grant applications, then we would find ourselves in the “simple” or “complicated” quadrants where either the relationship is obvious, or just requires “expert” knowledge. However, reflecting on my recent experiences gives me the insight that this situation is best described as “complex”, verging on “chaotic” and I have to acknowledge that any attempts at intervention represent attempts to explore this system, and do not construe action, since I cannot predict the outcomes.

This EU grant aims to integrate migrants economically into Morocco by facilitating access to employment, understood in terms of acquiring professional qualifications, securing paid employment, and establishing businesses. There is no mention of fundamental rights at work, let alone the importance of the right to organise and collective bargaining. This important omission suggests deeper institutional attitudes within the EU’s bureaucracy and accurately reflects Morocco’s own failure to ratify ILO Convention 87. There is an ethical dilemma as well that needs to be explored further. I have a deontological approach to fundamental rights (see blog) and believe that protecting these is always good, irrespective of the consequences. Furthermore, I also take a situationist approach as far as migrants in Morocco are concerned, in that – irrespective of any traditional prohibitions in Moroccan law for non-Moroccans to organise – I believe that it is strategically important for them to do so. The migrant association is different – they appear to be less concerned about morals, but have clear views on right or wrong depending on the practical outcome for migrants, suggesting a teleological approach to ethics within the absolutist quadrant. Acknowledging the differences in our respective positions is important because it provides clues as to what we value on a personal level – I can commit to supporting their efforts when I see progress towards the establishment of migrant collective structures; and the association can commit to conversing with me when they see real practical progress that meets migrants’ needs.

Here perhaps is a clue as to how to find a way of working with the migrants association on this EU grant proposal…

A Model for analysing Fundamental Worker Rights

In my previous blogs I started exploring Fundamental Worker Rights by situating these within the universally recognised core principles of the ILO whose expression, understanding and enforcement is directly linked to ethical and moral values. Something is ‘fundamental’ because it is vital to human beings and where denial may destroy its victims. And yet, few societies are successfully able to establish the conditions within which these rights find effective expression. Most, but not all, societies invest resources into education with the aim of eliminating child labour which protects this ‘fundamental’ worker right. Contrast this with “human trafficking” (the modern neologism for slavery or forced labour) is which is extremely difficult to eliminate because, while homo sapiens is an extraordinarily cooperative species, we are also ruthlessly exploitative of those perceived as ‘other’. Effectively, our limitless capacity at inventing ‘otherness’ facilitates this ability by enabling us to become blind to, ignorant of, or worse still – find justifications for exploitation.

Social institutions then, produce and anchor inequality – and do so despite the universal acknowledgement by nations around the world of ‘fundamental’ worker rights. How can such disconnect between rights and reality be explained? It is fairly easy to understand how child labour destroys life chances through stunted growth and lack of access to education. The remedy is also tried and tested: quality education and sufficient resources to allow children to stay in school. Such awareness of the problem and solutions is much more difficult with respect to trafficking or inequality since it requires critical awareness of how culture affects societal outcomes and thus life chances. Awareness distinguishes the importance of and underscores the need for the fourth ‘fundamental’ worker right. Unlike the other three ‘fundamental’ worker rights which are passive and invoke protection against inequality, forced or child labour, the fourth right is active: the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining are rights to agency and self-determination – in other words, the right to exercise power.

As forms of socially constructed norm or value, ‘fundamental’ worker rights represent attempts to establish and set limits on human behaviour. Rights are a form of intervention in the complex and chaotic processes of social change, which are directly and inextricably linked with power and conflict. The tools we use to explore this terrain must therefore account for complexity, be conflict-aware, and recognise that outcomes only become embedded through processes of social learning. Such a multi-dimensional model is proposed below:

 

Central to this analytical model is the recognition that the world is a disordered place upon which societies’ merely project permanence and stability through the establishment of institutions with their accompanying rules, norms, meanings and values. Institutions achieve stability – to paraphrase Hannah Arendt [1] – because they allow people to develop shared purpose that rely solely on valid and binding promises through which an unknowable future can be disposed of as if it were the present – and which consequently underpins all forms of collective human interaction by providing us with the sovereignty to manage our own affairs.

The “Cynefin” model, developed by Snowden [2], allows for the distinguishing of systems within this disorder defined as ‘simple’, ‘complicated’, ‘complex’, or ‘chaotic’, based on the relationship between cause and effect and proposes forms of interaction with each system type. In a ‘simple’ system cause and effect appears obvious allowing interaction to be described as sense, categorise and respond. ‘Complicated’ systems are ones where the cause and effect relationship requires investigation or expert knowledge, interaction requires sense, analysis and then response. In ‘complex’ systems the relationship between cause and effect is only knowable with hindsight; accordingly interaction is defined in terms as probe, sense and respond, and leads to emergent practice. Last are ‘chaotic’ systems, where the relationship between cause and effect is not visible at the level of that system. Interaction here is defined as act, sense and respond which in turn leads to novel practice. An institution’s ability to define and set the terms of the system in which it operates reflects the degree to which the players wield power within that system. Snowden adds one final feature to this model – a cliff marking the boundary between simple and chaotic systems and which represents the danger that lurks to catch out the unwary who, believing they are in a simple system, commit grievous errors when in fact it is not. It is safer to develop understanding by crossing systems boundaries from ‘simple’, to ‘complicated’, ‘complex’ and on to ‘chaotic’.

This progression from simple to chaotic is reflected in the next level of the model which incorporates conflict as developed by Goodhand [3]. Merely becoming conflict aware is not sufficient agency to overcome the dangers of conflict blindness. While it is a useful first step to allow individuals and organisations to work around conflict in an attempt to “do no harm”, conflict is a necessary and unavoidable part of social life. Denying the existence of conflict represents a form of privilege – by which I mean that those who benefit most from a culture are frequently ignorant of the challenges facing those who benefit least. By recognising that their agency is a form of working “on” conflict, individuals and organisations are taking a moral stand (and which I discuss in my Blog “Ethics, development and worker rights”) with the aim of achieving transformation.

This leads to the third level of critical social leaning systems as developed by Bawden [4] and into which the earlier models have two entry points – the intertwined insightful and experiential learning systems in which emotion interlinks with meaning to form bridges between our concrete and spiritual worlds. Observations are the perceptions that result from experience, by meditating and contemplation. Understanding leads to conceptualisation, as focusing leads to insight. This paves the way for acting to lead to experimentation, and accepting to application. The cycle then comes full circle with applying and planning leading to yet more experience.

Next, I want to look at how this model might be applied to situations where workers are being denied one or more of their ‘fundamental’ rights.

[1] Arendt, H. (1958/1998) The Human Condition (2^nd Edition), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, p.245

[2] Cognitive Edge (2017) Cynefin Framework Introduction [online], available at: http://cognitive-edge.com/videos/cynefin-framework-introduction/, accessed on 19^th September 2017

[3] see also: GSDRC (2017) The evolution of conflict sensitivity and the spectrum of ambition [online], available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/topic-guides/conflict-sensitivity/concepts/the-evolution-of-conflict-sensitivity/, accessed on 19^th September 2017

[4] Bawden, R. (2010) The Community Challenge: The Learning Response, in Blackmore, C. (2010) Social Learning Systems and Communities of Practice (Ed), Springer, London, The Open University, Milton Keynes, p.53

Fundamental Worker Rights, or are they?

I want to explore what a ‘fundamental’ right really is. In order to exist, do fundamental rights need to be codified? What is the opposite of a fundamental right? What implications can be drawn for how fundamental worker rights are vulgarised, policed and enforced?

As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘fundamental’ means to form a necessary base, the essential nature of something that is so basic as to be hard to alter.

Fundamental rights are not necessarily codified as indicated by the Nuremberg Trials where members of the Nazi regime were retroactively convicted of moral crimes that did not and, surprisingly, do not exist in statutory form. Offenders were held accountable on an individual basis for the morally repugnant acts that were committed collectively and were unable to claim defence based on the absence of a relevant law. The presumption was established that some acts are so inherently wrong that people don’t even need to be told – it’s that obvious.

The opposite of ‘fundamental’ rights might be defined as rights that are ‘auxiliary’ – ones that are both secondary and changeable at will. The distinction between the poles of ‘fundamental’ and ‘auxiliary’ rights revolves around values – the social processes through which meaning is constructed. This suggests that an analysis of ‘fundamental’ rights needs to explore the systems within which they are anchored and associated degrees of complexity.

In 1998, the ILO declared four categories of worker rights as fundamental [1], namely:

• The elimination of forced or compulsory labour, 
• The abolition of child labour, 
• The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, and 
• Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.

These rights have been recognised as universal, meaning that as far as the world is concerned, they apply to all people everywhere, regardless of the country’s level of economic development, or if the Convention has been ratified. Furthermore, people with special needs, including the unemployed and migrant workers, are specifically included. Equity, social progress and the eradication of poverty cannot be achieved through economic growth alone, but requires the adoption of additional measures. Put another way, and to paraphrase the Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, ‘fundamental’ worker rights represent both the means and the ends of development.

The ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work thus applies a similar moral presumption to that established at Nuremberg. Because it destroys people, the violation of any one of the four categories of fundamental worker right is automatically considered to be a morally reprehensible act, something that is so self-evident that the perpetuators ‘know’ they have done wrong and where collective wrongdoing does not excuse individual culpability. And yet, while global condemnation of the acts that led up to Nuremberg was universal and long-lasting, acts that violate fundamental ILO worker rights are only ever condemned sporadically and in abbreviated form.  

In my next blog I want to take this analysis further and examine some methods and models that might allow further exploration.

[1] http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm

Ethics, development and worker rights

Worker rights are linked to the contested forces of development, so the process through which exploitation is identified and overcome represents an ethical issue. In my next blog I look at issues raised by the establishment of worker rights norms at supra-national levels (such as the ILO, World Bank lending standards, trade agreements and the SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals), however here I want to look at the social construction of worker rights. Simply defining what lies within the system boundaries of worker rights is highly informative, since it reveals how exploitation is perceived and consequently how issues of worker rights, relative scale of exploitation (at general and specific levels), capacity and power of the worker, relative to the circumstances, to identify, challenge, mitigate and improve their situation. Each aspect represents a value judgement, for which the ethical framework adapted from Forsyth (1980) and Slim (1997) is useful since it highlights how differing views can result in conflict, and how difficult it may be to reconcile the contradictions.

Figure: Ethical analysis based on Forsyth and Slim

Ethical analysis, as shown in the figure, is based on determining the degree to which an individual’s moral views can be ascribed to low or high relativism and idealism. On the x-axis, Absolutists believe that actions are intrinsically right or wrong and can be contrasted to Relativists. On the y-axis, Realists are pragmatic, compared with Idealists who believe that only ethically correct actions will produce desirable outcomes. This produces a frame of four ethical ‘types’, which is further refined by the cross-cutting axes of deontological and teleological ethics that represent the tension between Kantian morality and one in which the ends justify the means. In exploring deontological ethics, I find Immanuel Kant’s deontology of the Categorical Imperative useful. An act is only morally justified if: (1) objectively speaking, the act can be done as if it were a universal law (one that applies everywhere and at all times); and (2) subjectively speaking, the act must be both the means to an end as well as an end in its own right, and (3) practically speaking, accepting (1) and (2) represents an auto-constraint.

As such:
Exceptionists

may see worker rights as being subservient to other issues that serve the greater social good (for example, the ILO prohibition on forced labour is not absolute – a State may require it during times of national emergency). Distinguishing between teleological and deontological Exceptionists reveals the extent to which the system of worker rights is seen as part of wider social (i.e. political) goals.
Absolutists may see worker rights as essential to achieving the best outcome for all (and might thus focus on correlations between high levels of worker rights and low levels of inequality, for example through the lens of the Gini coefficient). Distinguishing between teleological and deontological Absolutists reveals the extent to which worker rights are seen as a practical method for achieving this “best outcome” (however defined).
Situationists may see worker rights in ways that are not traditionally understood (such as challenging the social construction of gender that marginalises domestic and care-provider work). Distinguishing between teleological and deontological Situationists reveals the extent to which worker rights may be harnessed to serve the strategic interest of breaking the tradition. 
With Subjectists, the distinction between teleological and deontological ethics becomes critical. A teleological Subjectist may not see worker rights as useful, unless these represent a means to achieve specific end. Deontological Subjectists may see worker rights as an ultimate moral duty, irrespective of any consequences.

In six of these eight ethical scenarios, worker rights serve either as the means to or as a component of wider social standards. Contentious issues revolve around interpretation (e.g.: does this national emergency warrant recourse to forced labour), enforcement (e.g.: how should worker rights reduce gender disparity in pay), or scope (e.g.: are worker rights appropriate to addressing the needs of different institutional contexts, such as informal work).  Furthermore, the lenses of interpretation, enforcement and scope allow the exploration of issues and values raised earlier, starting with the perception of exploitation.

The seventh ethical scenario of the teleological Subjectist may fit with certain commercial interests whereby worker rights receive superficial consideration (e.g.: part of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) plan), to be disregarded in an effort to maximise profit. Contrast this to the eighth ethical scenario of the deontological Subjectist who, by placing worker rights on a pedestal, disregards their limitations (e.g.: a consequence may be seen by the dramatic reduction in Western trade union membership since the 1980’s).   

These last two ethical scenarios are interesting because of what they reveal about the institutions surrounding both work and rights and the historical development of modern worker rights norms at the supra-national level, which is for the next blog posting.

Forsyth, D. (1980), cited by Forsyth, D., ‘A Theory of Ethics Positions’, in ‘Studying Our Social World’, Blogpost, available at: https://donforsyth.wordpress.com/ethics/the-epq/ [online], accessed on: 29^th August 2017
Slim, H. (1997) ‘Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibilities in Political Emergencies and War’, Centre for Development and Emergency Practice, Oxford Brookes University, Disasters, Vol. 21(3), pp.244-257