Migrant workers’ rights in Morocco: developing a proposal

This next story, represent my attempt to resolve a personal dilemma by tying together some the different elements explored in earlier blogs. I have been asked to help a small migrant association in Morocco respond to a grant application issued by the EU with the specific aim of helping migrants integrate into Morocco. The grant is politically motivated, since it supports EU policy of externalising its borders (in this case by getting Morocco to police the land and sea borders with Spain in order to reduce clandestine migration) and because it supports the Moroccan Monarch’s vision of welcoming and integrating migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into the country (and for which the government of Morocco has conducted two exceptional amnesties in 2014 and 2017 that allowed undocumented migrants to become registered). Morocco was recently readmitted into the African Union, and I suspect that the improved treatment of their fellow African’s may have played an important role. The migrant association played an important role throughout all this through its advocacy for improved migrant rights; by educating and raising awareness amongst migrants about the exceptional amnesties; and has gained real hands-on experience of the difficulties involved in achieving migrant integration.

Research I conducted earlier this year suggests that migrants and Moroccans share an important characteristic – neither have conceptualised Morocco as a migrant destination country. Certainly many sub-Saharan migrants with whom I spoke explained that they often felt harassed or threatened in Morocco and which contradicts the “terre d’acceuil” image the country likes to project. Furthermore, this association has effectively run out of money, which means that it is at a critical point since my research also indicates that leadership amongst sub-Saharan African migrants depends almost exclusively on the leader’s ability to provide resources and support to their community. Thirdly, I am conscious of significant difficulties in communication, and this creates a pervading sense of distrust – between migrants and Moroccans, between migrants and Westerners, and even amongst migrants themselves. There are deeper issues at work here, which can probably only be explored at the level of the underlying institutional systems.

This migrant association is extremely well-networked both within Morocco and internationally and consequently discovers opportunities for grant funding. However, the nature of multi-dimensional poverty seems, much like the mythological figure of Tantalus whose reach for grapes that are just out of reach, to condemn both to an eternity of suffering. Grants are not neutral devices for combatting poverty since they require the acquisition and mastery of social technologies that this association does not currently possess. And the development processes that I am familiar with using and which are integral to any grant proposal do not appear to elicit the kinds of critical responses from my interlocutors at the migrants association that would allow me to help them further. We are not, in other words, “turning together” by engaging in a conversation. The Cynefin framework described in an earlier blog helps me here: if all concerned understood the social technology of grant applications, then we would find ourselves in the “simple” or “complicated” quadrants where either the relationship is obvious, or just requires “expert” knowledge. However, reflecting on my recent experiences gives me the insight that this situation is best described as “complex”, verging on “chaotic” and I have to acknowledge that any attempts at intervention represent attempts to explore this system, and do not construe action, since I cannot predict the outcomes.

This EU grant aims to integrate migrants economically into Morocco by facilitating access to employment, understood in terms of acquiring professional qualifications, securing paid employment, and establishing businesses. There is no mention of fundamental rights at work, let alone the importance of the right to organise and collective bargaining. This important omission suggests deeper institutional attitudes within the EU’s bureaucracy and accurately reflects Morocco’s own failure to ratify ILO Convention 87. There is an ethical dilemma as well that needs to be explored further. I have a deontological approach to fundamental rights (see blog) and believe that protecting these is always good, irrespective of the consequences. Furthermore, I also take a situationist approach as far as migrants in Morocco are concerned, in that – irrespective of any traditional prohibitions in Moroccan law for non-Moroccans to organise – I believe that it is strategically important for them to do so. The migrant association is different – they appear to be less concerned about morals, but have clear views on right or wrong depending on the practical outcome for migrants, suggesting a teleological approach to ethics within the absolutist quadrant. Acknowledging the differences in our respective positions is important because it provides clues as to what we value on a personal level – I can commit to supporting their efforts when I see progress towards the establishment of migrant collective structures; and the association can commit to conversing with me when they see real practical progress that meets migrants’ needs.

Here perhaps is a clue as to how to find a way of working with the migrants association on this EU grant proposal…

A Model for analysing Fundamental Worker Rights

In my previous blogs I started exploring Fundamental Worker Rights by situating these within the universally recognised core principles of the ILO whose expression, understanding and enforcement is directly linked to ethical and moral values. Something is ‘fundamental’ because it is vital to human beings and where denial may destroy its victims. And yet, few societies are successfully able to establish the conditions within which these rights find effective expression. Most, but not all, societies invest resources into education with the aim of eliminating child labour which protects this ‘fundamental’ worker right. Contrast this with “human trafficking” (the modern neologism for slavery or forced labour) is which is extremely difficult to eliminate because, while homo sapiens is an extraordinarily cooperative species, we are also ruthlessly exploitative of those perceived as ‘other’. Effectively, our limitless capacity at inventing ‘otherness’ facilitates this ability by enabling us to become blind to, ignorant of, or worse still – find justifications for exploitation.

Social institutions then, produce and anchor inequality – and do so despite the universal acknowledgement by nations around the world of ‘fundamental’ worker rights. How can such disconnect between rights and reality be explained? It is fairly easy to understand how child labour destroys life chances through stunted growth and lack of access to education. The remedy is also tried and tested: quality education and sufficient resources to allow children to stay in school. Such awareness of the problem and solutions is much more difficult with respect to trafficking or inequality since it requires critical awareness of how culture affects societal outcomes and thus life chances. Awareness distinguishes the importance of and underscores the need for the fourth ‘fundamental’ worker right. Unlike the other three ‘fundamental’ worker rights which are passive and invoke protection against inequality, forced or child labour, the fourth right is active: the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining are rights to agency and self-determination – in other words, the right to exercise power.

As forms of socially constructed norm or value, ‘fundamental’ worker rights represent attempts to establish and set limits on human behaviour. Rights are a form of intervention in the complex and chaotic processes of social change, which are directly and inextricably linked with power and conflict. The tools we use to explore this terrain must therefore account for complexity, be conflict-aware, and recognise that outcomes only become embedded through processes of social learning. Such a multi-dimensional model is proposed below:

 

Central to this analytical model is the recognition that the world is a disordered place upon which societies’ merely project permanence and stability through the establishment of institutions with their accompanying rules, norms, meanings and values. Institutions achieve stability – to paraphrase Hannah Arendt [1] – because they allow people to develop shared purpose that rely solely on valid and binding promises through which an unknowable future can be disposed of as if it were the present – and which consequently underpins all forms of collective human interaction by providing us with the sovereignty to manage our own affairs.

The “Cynefin” model, developed by Snowden [2], allows for the distinguishing of systems within this disorder defined as ‘simple’, ‘complicated’, ‘complex’, or ‘chaotic’, based on the relationship between cause and effect and proposes forms of interaction with each system type. In a ‘simple’ system cause and effect appears obvious allowing interaction to be described as sense, categorise and respond. ‘Complicated’ systems are ones where the cause and effect relationship requires investigation or expert knowledge, interaction requires sense, analysis and then response. In ‘complex’ systems the relationship between cause and effect is only knowable with hindsight; accordingly interaction is defined in terms as probe, sense and respond, and leads to emergent practice. Last are ‘chaotic’ systems, where the relationship between cause and effect is not visible at the level of that system. Interaction here is defined as act, sense and respond which in turn leads to novel practice. An institution’s ability to define and set the terms of the system in which it operates reflects the degree to which the players wield power within that system. Snowden adds one final feature to this model – a cliff marking the boundary between simple and chaotic systems and which represents the danger that lurks to catch out the unwary who, believing they are in a simple system, commit grievous errors when in fact it is not. It is safer to develop understanding by crossing systems boundaries from ‘simple’, to ‘complicated’, ‘complex’ and on to ‘chaotic’.

This progression from simple to chaotic is reflected in the next level of the model which incorporates conflict as developed by Goodhand [3]. Merely becoming conflict aware is not sufficient agency to overcome the dangers of conflict blindness. While it is a useful first step to allow individuals and organisations to work around conflict in an attempt to “do no harm”, conflict is a necessary and unavoidable part of social life. Denying the existence of conflict represents a form of privilege – by which I mean that those who benefit most from a culture are frequently ignorant of the challenges facing those who benefit least. By recognising that their agency is a form of working “on” conflict, individuals and organisations are taking a moral stand (and which I discuss in my Blog “Ethics, development and worker rights”) with the aim of achieving transformation.

This leads to the third level of critical social leaning systems as developed by Bawden [4] and into which the earlier models have two entry points – the intertwined insightful and experiential learning systems in which emotion interlinks with meaning to form bridges between our concrete and spiritual worlds. Observations are the perceptions that result from experience, by meditating and contemplation. Understanding leads to conceptualisation, as focusing leads to insight. This paves the way for acting to lead to experimentation, and accepting to application. The cycle then comes full circle with applying and planning leading to yet more experience.

Next, I want to look at how this model might be applied to situations where workers are being denied one or more of their ‘fundamental’ rights.

[1] Arendt, H. (1958/1998) The Human Condition (2^nd Edition), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, p.245

[2] Cognitive Edge (2017) Cynefin Framework Introduction [online], available at: http://cognitive-edge.com/videos/cynefin-framework-introduction/, accessed on 19^th September 2017

[3] see also: GSDRC (2017) The evolution of conflict sensitivity and the spectrum of ambition [online], available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/topic-guides/conflict-sensitivity/concepts/the-evolution-of-conflict-sensitivity/, accessed on 19^th September 2017

[4] Bawden, R. (2010) The Community Challenge: The Learning Response, in Blackmore, C. (2010) Social Learning Systems and Communities of Practice (Ed), Springer, London, The Open University, Milton Keynes, p.53

Fundamental Worker Rights, or are they?

I want to explore what a ‘fundamental’ right really is. In order to exist, do fundamental rights need to be codified? What is the opposite of a fundamental right? What implications can be drawn for how fundamental worker rights are vulgarised, policed and enforced?

As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘fundamental’ means to form a necessary base, the essential nature of something that is so basic as to be hard to alter.

Fundamental rights are not necessarily codified as indicated by the Nuremberg Trials where members of the Nazi regime were retroactively convicted of moral crimes that did not and, surprisingly, do not exist in statutory form. Offenders were held accountable on an individual basis for the morally repugnant acts that were committed collectively and were unable to claim defence based on the absence of a relevant law. The presumption was established that some acts are so inherently wrong that people don’t even need to be told – it’s that obvious.

The opposite of ‘fundamental’ rights might be defined as rights that are ‘auxiliary’ – ones that are both secondary and changeable at will. The distinction between the poles of ‘fundamental’ and ‘auxiliary’ rights revolves around values – the social processes through which meaning is constructed. This suggests that an analysis of ‘fundamental’ rights needs to explore the systems within which they are anchored and associated degrees of complexity.

In 1998, the ILO declared four categories of worker rights as fundamental [1], namely:

• The elimination of forced or compulsory labour, 
• The abolition of child labour, 
• The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, and 
• Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.

These rights have been recognised as universal, meaning that as far as the world is concerned, they apply to all people everywhere, regardless of the country’s level of economic development, or if the Convention has been ratified. Furthermore, people with special needs, including the unemployed and migrant workers, are specifically included. Equity, social progress and the eradication of poverty cannot be achieved through economic growth alone, but requires the adoption of additional measures. Put another way, and to paraphrase the Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, ‘fundamental’ worker rights represent both the means and the ends of development.

The ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work thus applies a similar moral presumption to that established at Nuremberg. Because it destroys people, the violation of any one of the four categories of fundamental worker right is automatically considered to be a morally reprehensible act, something that is so self-evident that the perpetuators ‘know’ they have done wrong and where collective wrongdoing does not excuse individual culpability. And yet, while global condemnation of the acts that led up to Nuremberg was universal and long-lasting, acts that violate fundamental ILO worker rights are only ever condemned sporadically and in abbreviated form.  

In my next blog I want to take this analysis further and examine some methods and models that might allow further exploration.

[1] http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm

Ethics, development and worker rights

Worker rights are linked to the contested forces of development, so the process through which exploitation is identified and overcome represents an ethical issue. In my next blog I look at issues raised by the establishment of worker rights norms at supra-national levels (such as the ILO, World Bank lending standards, trade agreements and the SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals), however here I want to look at the social construction of worker rights. Simply defining what lies within the system boundaries of worker rights is highly informative, since it reveals how exploitation is perceived and consequently how issues of worker rights, relative scale of exploitation (at general and specific levels), capacity and power of the worker, relative to the circumstances, to identify, challenge, mitigate and improve their situation. Each aspect represents a value judgement, for which the ethical framework adapted from Forsyth (1980) and Slim (1997) is useful since it highlights how differing views can result in conflict, and how difficult it may be to reconcile the contradictions.

Figure: Ethical analysis based on Forsyth and Slim

Ethical analysis, as shown in the figure, is based on determining the degree to which an individual’s moral views can be ascribed to low or high relativism and idealism. On the x-axis, Absolutists believe that actions are intrinsically right or wrong and can be contrasted to Relativists. On the y-axis, Realists are pragmatic, compared with Idealists who believe that only ethically correct actions will produce desirable outcomes. This produces a frame of four ethical ‘types’, which is further refined by the cross-cutting axes of deontological and teleological ethics that represent the tension between Kantian morality and one in which the ends justify the means. In exploring deontological ethics, I find Immanuel Kant’s deontology of the Categorical Imperative useful. An act is only morally justified if: (1) objectively speaking, the act can be done as if it were a universal law (one that applies everywhere and at all times); and (2) subjectively speaking, the act must be both the means to an end as well as an end in its own right, and (3) practically speaking, accepting (1) and (2) represents an auto-constraint.

As such:
Exceptionists

may see worker rights as being subservient to other issues that serve the greater social good (for example, the ILO prohibition on forced labour is not absolute – a State may require it during times of national emergency). Distinguishing between teleological and deontological Exceptionists reveals the extent to which the system of worker rights is seen as part of wider social (i.e. political) goals.
Absolutists may see worker rights as essential to achieving the best outcome for all (and might thus focus on correlations between high levels of worker rights and low levels of inequality, for example through the lens of the Gini coefficient). Distinguishing between teleological and deontological Absolutists reveals the extent to which worker rights are seen as a practical method for achieving this “best outcome” (however defined).
Situationists may see worker rights in ways that are not traditionally understood (such as challenging the social construction of gender that marginalises domestic and care-provider work). Distinguishing between teleological and deontological Situationists reveals the extent to which worker rights may be harnessed to serve the strategic interest of breaking the tradition. 
With Subjectists, the distinction between teleological and deontological ethics becomes critical. A teleological Subjectist may not see worker rights as useful, unless these represent a means to achieve specific end. Deontological Subjectists may see worker rights as an ultimate moral duty, irrespective of any consequences.

In six of these eight ethical scenarios, worker rights serve either as the means to or as a component of wider social standards. Contentious issues revolve around interpretation (e.g.: does this national emergency warrant recourse to forced labour), enforcement (e.g.: how should worker rights reduce gender disparity in pay), or scope (e.g.: are worker rights appropriate to addressing the needs of different institutional contexts, such as informal work).  Furthermore, the lenses of interpretation, enforcement and scope allow the exploration of issues and values raised earlier, starting with the perception of exploitation.

The seventh ethical scenario of the teleological Subjectist may fit with certain commercial interests whereby worker rights receive superficial consideration (e.g.: part of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) plan), to be disregarded in an effort to maximise profit. Contrast this to the eighth ethical scenario of the deontological Subjectist who, by placing worker rights on a pedestal, disregards their limitations (e.g.: a consequence may be seen by the dramatic reduction in Western trade union membership since the 1980’s).   

These last two ethical scenarios are interesting because of what they reveal about the institutions surrounding both work and rights and the historical development of modern worker rights norms at the supra-national level, which is for the next blog posting.

Forsyth, D. (1980), cited by Forsyth, D., ‘A Theory of Ethics Positions’, in ‘Studying Our Social World’, Blogpost, available at: https://donforsyth.wordpress.com/ethics/the-epq/ [online], accessed on: 29^th August 2017
Slim, H. (1997) ‘Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibilities in Political Emergencies and War’, Centre for Development and Emergency Practice, Oxford Brookes University, Disasters, Vol. 21(3), pp.244-257

Starting out

"What is the point of worker rights if these simply aren't enforced?" I've been asked this question in many different forms on multiple occasions, usually while conducting workshops for worker activists, and most frequently in relation to Convention rights established by the International Labour Organization (ILO). My usual response was to ask how many people in the room actually obeyed the speed limit while driving (typically nobody) and then get discussion going as to why certain laws are generally obeyed and others not. What becomes very clear is how social values have a direct bearing on the who, what, when, where, why and how of rights and their enforcement. And this perspective has an immediate and powerful effect. For a right to mean something it must be understood and claimed as a norm through human agency, part of the 'rules of the game'. Just as words reify meaning through which we socially construct our reality, rights underpin institutions. When a right looses its meaning, the institution upon which it is built risks becoming less than the sum of its parts. Since many societies distinguish between those who do, and those who do not enjoy worker rights (often identified as 'formal' and 'informal' work), an inherent contradiction exists within that institution, which this blog seeks to explore. 

Having recently completed an MSc in Development Management at the UK's Open University, a process that allowed me to reflect upon my experiences working as a worker rights activist and later as a programme director for a small international NGO, I am looking for the best ways in which to continue my engagement with the world of development and specifically how to help struggling communities in claiming their equitable share of economic development. Through blogging, my aim is to publicly set out my opinions, thoughts and views, and to invite comments, questions, as well as highlight areas for further exploration and discussion. In so doing, I hope to start a conversation with as broad a range of people as possible, in the hope of 'turning together', from the Latin roots of com "with, together" and versare "to turn". In discussing worker rights, there is a potential that these blogs may be used by those who do not share my values, or that my work may directly or indirectly harm the process of improving worker rights. So to increase the opportunities for conflict to be constructive and so transformative, my next posting aims to explore the ethical framework I intend to use.

In addition to the theory, through this blog I also want to explore the practical aspects of getting back to the coalface - that is becoming directly and personally involved with people who are struggling for their rights and what mutual and co-dependent learning is taking place. This has three basic, yet interrelated dimensions: with and for whom, in what organisational context, and where and when? The first question has a straightforward answer - for the time being, I would like to continue working with migrant workers in Morocco. There are some organisational forms that facilitate this, such as continuing as an independent (and auto-financed) consultant, or setting up a charitable organisation (which would require considerable new learning) to raise funds. The questions where and when are directly linked to the issues arising from the second and the solutions found. 

Stay tuned!